Russian paper examines Implications of Iran's refusal to accept West's offer

Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Georgiy Ilyich Mirskiy, chief scientific associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, under the rubric "Ideas and People": "The Tale of the White Bull".

The Iranian atom: a radical change for the better or deja vu?

Whether Iran will become a nuclear power is one of the most widely discussed issues of the last few years. The UN Security Council has already imposed sanctions on Iran, demanding that it halt work to enrich uranium, but so far there has been no progress. The "Tale of the White Bull" continues. It is just that no one knows what is on the minds of the Tehran rulers and whether they really have only a "peaceful atom" in mind in stepping up work to enrich uranium.

But here is one very significant fact: a few years ago, Iran rejected Russia's proposal to create joint ventures to enrich Iranian uranium on our territory; it was contemplated that Russia would enrich it for Iran and load the reactor, and thus the Iranians would obtain ready-made fuel. But that would be only low-enriched uranium unsuitable for military purposes, and it was specifically for that reason that Tehran rejected Moscow's plan.

ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, said in an interview: "The assumption that tomorrow we will wake up and Iran will have nuclear weapons is not supported by the facts known to us." But after all no serious person would even assert that this "will happen tomorrow." Serious people have worked and studied the problem. And then in May came the publication of the report by the American and Russian experts who worked at the instruction of the independent international organization EastWest Institute [in English]. The report entitled "The Nuclear and Missile Potential of Iran" points out that Iran would need only from one to three years to produce a nuclear explosive device on condition that the enrichment of uranium reaches the military level. Another five years -- to build an atomic warhead that could be delivered to the target by a ballistic missile. "In from six to eight years, Iran would be able to build a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead weighing 1,000 kilograms a distance of 2,000 kilometers."

And now we have learned that a second plant for enriching uranium has been secretly built in Iran (near the city of Qum) and tests have been conducted of a new missile with an operating radius of up to 2,000 kilometers.

Does all that mean that Iran firmly intends to build an atomic bomb? Not necessarily.

Where the Danger Is Hidden

The theory of really building an atomic bomb comes from the notion that Tehran is not bluffing and not blackmailing the West, but actually intends to produce several atomic bombs. But what for? To launch them? Against whom might Iran use a nuclear weapon? It is unlikely to be against America or Western Europe.

Israel above all is worried; after all it is 1,300 kilometers from the Iranian border to Tel Aviv. But it is difficult to imagine that the Iranians have decided on a nuclear war with Israel. The present Tehran rulers can be considered narrow-minded fanatics, but even so they are not madmen. Despite all their hatred of the "Zionist formation" (that is what Israel is called in Iran, in unison with the Arab radicals), it is unlikely that they intend to drop a bomb on the Jewish state, since they are well aware of the consequences of such an attempt. Israel is capable at the last moment of delivering a preventive strike that would be a disaster for Iran. And even if they did manage to get through the Israeli missile defense system, not only 6 million Jews but also the same number of Arabs on Israeli and Palestinian territory would be the victims of the strike, which is unacceptable to Iran, which is trying to become a leader of the Islamic world.

Anyway, the theory of the Iranians' use of an atomic bomb for offensive purposes is not very realistic. But what about the defensive theory? In order to take away the Americans' desire to attack their country and insure themselves against possible aggression. The Tehran "mullah-cracy" has probably taken Saddam Husayn's experience into account and believes that if he had really possessed a weapon of mass destruction, Bush would not have decided on war.

The theory of nuclear blackmail presupposes that in reality Iran's goal is not to produce a bomb, but to achieve the kind of progress in that area that makes people believe that it can be built at any moment. In that case what specifically does Iran want to achieve?

Above all the West's assistance in economic development as payment for Tehran not taking the "last step." But as the experience of North Korea shows, a purely economic deal, no matter how advantageous it might be, does not suit rulers of an authoritarian state who are keeping the entire world in the dark or even in fear and making them guess -- "Is there already a bomb or not?" Not only economic but political guarantees as well are needed: America must once and for all officially, with the United Nation's participation, abandon its "aggressive intentions" toward their country. The Iranian rulers' fears rose sharply after the American attack on Iraq. After all, these people, who are not very familiar with the contemporary world and practically never have been in the West, may seriously believe that the "Great Satan" firmly intends at any price to destroy the Islamic Republic.

Iran needs to be removed from the countries of the "axis of evil." And if we believe the theory being examined, the sense of the Iranian nuclear program is primarily to get both economic assistance and political concessions from the West.

It appears that Iran's rulers in principle would like to bring the process of the development of nuclear energy to the point where they will have a real possibility of building an atomic bomb. But specifically a possibility. Not necessarily to actually produce a bomb. Most likely the hypothetical Iranian atomic bomb is a political weapon. It is important not so much to have a bomb in their hands "physically" as to achieve a state of "five-minute readiness" to have it. That is "talking from a position of strength," if you will -- blackmail, the "North Korean version" (it is true, however, that Pyongyang went further than simple blackmail).

But let us return to the predictions of experts. Six or seven years -- and it will be done, a strike at a distance of 2,000 kilometers will be possible. It seems that there is still a lot of time and there is no reason to rush into anything. But it seems that quite recently on television we were watching American soldiers entering Baghdad and the statue of Saddam flying to the ground, but actually six years have passed. "The longer we live, the shorter the years become" -- that is what one song says. The years fly by unnoticed and suddenly, as ElBaradei said, "We will wake up and Iran will have a nuclear weapon." It may make no difference to those who live in Moscow, Paris, or New York; but what about those who live in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv?

That is in fact the danger. The arguments cited above to the effect that most likely the Iranians do not intend to produce a bomb and certainly not to launch it are of little comfort to the inhabitants of Israel, who see a power not far away whose leaders assert that the Jewish state will be erased from the map of the world moving toward the creation of an atomic weapon. What guarantee might the Israelis have that Tehran will stop one step from building the bomb? More than 8,000 centrifuges are already turning in a plant in Natanz. But what should they do? Bomb Iran's nuclear installations? All the experts claim that the nuclear elements in Iran are dispersed and hidden underground and a strike against Iran would merely postpone the Iranian nuclear program for a few years, and moreover, after such a strike, the Iranians, who would no longer be constrained by anything, would undertake to produce an atomic bomb with doubled force. But all that sounds unconvincing to many Israelis.

In the Western press, the question has long been discussed: what is preferable, a nuclear Iran or war? Both in the West and in our country, people say that we must not allow Iran to become a nuclear power, but there is a certain amount of insincerity in these statements. "We cannot live with a nuclear Iran." But how can that be? After all, the world does live with nuclear countries -- India, Pakistan, and Israel, not to mention the great powers. Of course, if Iran is going to have an atomic bomb, most likely the nuclear arms race will begin throughout the entire vast Near East Region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and in fact other countries will say: "So how are we any worse than Iran?" The Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be thrown into the waste basket. But this would all the same not be a disaster for humankind. The only country for whom a nuclear Iran is an existential problem, a question of life and death, is Israel. So it is specifically Israel's possible response that is the central point of the international crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear program.

The Israeli leaders understand that a strike against Iran would create a multitude of problems, but they cannot fail to take the people's sentiments into account. So it would be very dangerous to count on the Israelis to sit and wait while diplomacy "does its job." We certainly cannot rule out the possibility of an air strike by Israel against Iran together with the Americans or alone, and hence, a regional war is possible, one that in any case, even despite its wishes, the United States would be drawn into.

Of course, for the United States, an Israeli strike against Iran would be disastrous, if we are speaking of its relations with the world of Islam, since Muslims would lay all the blame on Washington. Obama's entire "new line" would go up in smoke regardless of whether the United States got mixed up in this war or not. That is why he, just like Sarkozy and Gordon Brown, raised the question of sanctions so decisively. For them that is above all a way to prevent a war that would do colossal damage to the West. Russia would remain on the sidelines, but it would face an extremely difficult choice -- how to conduct itself. After all, in addition to everything else, such a war would undoubtedly give a strong push to the development of Islamist extremism, including in the CIS countries.

Mild Pressure

What should be done to prevent such a development of events? To pressure Iran and drive it into a corner is unpromising and counterproductive, and in this sense Russian diplomacy is correct. But then, to create a united front with the West in an attempt to exert "mild pressure," in other words, to offer Tehran all possible kinds of "carrots" beginning with a promise to build some atomic power plants and ending with agreements on large-scale investments -- that might work. Let us recall that back in 2007 the "group of six" (the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) offered Iran extremely favorable terms of an agreement: to build atomic power plants, accept Iran into the WTO, supply spare parts for civilian aircraft, ensure an influx of investments, and so forth. Iran did not go for this, since in exchange it was supposed to stop work on enriching uranium. Last year the Western powers repeated this proposal, and once again without a result.

But even so it is specifically that version of dealing with Iran that seems the most promising, especially taking into account the latest domestic policy events in Iran that showed the limits of power of the current rulers and their degree of dependence on the society that they could formerly ignore altogether. Now a split is obvious even among the ayatollahs themselves, and the regime is no longer strong enough to act with its former rash intolerance.

The meeting of the "group of six" with Iran's representatives that was held in Geneva on 1 October, to the surprise of many, took precisely the course of the "mild," conciliatory version. Iran pledged to allow IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors access to the new plant in Qum. Greater control is also contemplated over the old plant in Natanz. And most importantly -- the Iranians agreed that the further enrichment of about two-thirds of the reserves of uranium that they have and production of fuel out of this (low-enriched) uranium would occur not in their country, but in Russia and France, and the fuel would be brought back to Iran. If everything in fact goes that way and the IAEA most rigorously watches to make sure that even that part of the uranium that remains in Iran in no event is subjected to enrichment to the level of 90 degrees, making it possible to produce a bomb -- then everyone can breathe a sign of relief.

The Hostages of the Nuclear Program

What led to the possibility of such an agreement? First, the construction of the plant in Qum caused an explosion of indignation among Western leaders, who immediately raised the question of the need to impose new, harsher sanctions against Iran. It is true, however, that the likelihood of such truly "grievous" sanctions for Iran as an embargo on oil exports and a ban on importing gasoline is small, since even if Russia did not object, it would be vetoed by China, which has unbelievably stepped up its economic ties with Iran in recent years, notably having concluded an agreement on deliveries of enormous volumes of Iranian liquefied gas. But even without that Iran's economy could be gravely harmed by other types of sanctions that the Western powers would impose (for example, we have learned of an American plan to block insurance operations on deliveries of goods to Iran).

Secondly, the obvious change in Russia's position, which was expressed in President Medvedev's words that in some cases sanctions are necessary, played a role. And although a couple of days later, Medvedev announced that "comfortable conditions" must be created for Iran for the sake of setting up cooperation with it, the Iranians could not fail to feel, in contrast, some discomfort.

Third -- and this is most likely the most important -- the West stopped insisting that Iran halt work on enriching uranium as a preliminary condition for talks. In that way those "comfortable conditions" that Medvedev was talking about were in fact created. The point is that the Iranian leaders are essentially hostages to their own nuclear program, which in Iran has become a unique kind of "national idea" (to use a popular expression in our country), and they fear above all being accused of weakness, tractability, and excessive credulity. They could not agree to stop enriching uranium, and in Geneva after this condition was lifted, the Tehran rulers "saved face": enrichment of uranium would continue, although on someone else's land. You won't be able to make a bomb out of that kind of uranium -- but so what? If someone inside the country accuses them of being too tractable, they can always say: "But we never even wanted to build a bomb, the foreign slanderers made that up, and we were always saying that the goals of our nuclear program have always been exclusively peaceful: now we have already achieved the level of development of a nuclear economy that in principle permits us to carry out a military program if a threat to Iran's security emerges; we have now done what we wanted, and our enemies were unable to stop us -- that is our victory." And the entire Iranian people, who are by no means burning with the desire to fight America, would only be happy to learn that having successfully carried out a nuclear program, Iran affirmed its greatness and worth while at the same time avoiding war.

In other words, one simply cannot imagine any better conditions than the ones that the West and Russia have offered Iran. If you don't want to stop enriching uranium, fine, it will be enriched for you and then the ready-made fuel presented for the reactor on a platter; you will receive everything that is needed to develop peaceful power engineering without any effort. And after the meeting in Geneva, it seemed that Tehran might break out of the captive stereotype and change the traditional approved model of behavior. But soon signs appeared that everything was going back to the same old ways. Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Laridzhani [as transliterated] claims that in insisting on exporting low-enriched uranium to Russia, the West intends to "deceive us and impose its will on us." It sounds somehow absurd if you bear in mind that Moscow came out in favor of specifically that plan; does it mean that the West is using the unfortunate, weak-willed Russia as a pawn in its game? No one will believe that or the talk that Iran is supposedly afraid of sending its uranium to Russia out of the fear of losing control over it. It is certainly not from Russia that the Iranians can expect perfidy and all kinds of dirty tricks, and they know that very well.

All this is unimportant and cannot be taken at face value. And if very soon now it becomes clear that Iran has also rejected this way to solve the crisis, one most favorable for it, that will be the most convincing confirmation that the Tehran leaders are in fact afraid of only one thing: the kind of foreign control that would not give them the opportunity to bring the enrichment of uranium to the "military stage," when they would then be able to make a bomb. All the present arguments of the Iranian officials would only be a cover and a fabricated, ingenious pretext to procrastinate.

Does that mean that everything has reached a final impasse? Actually it is still too early to say that. To try to move Tehran from its position is still possible, and here Russia's role is exceptionally important. We have just seen that even the allusion made by the Russian president to the possibility that Russia will join in solidarity with the West has already played its role in the talks in Geneva, even though later Tehran in fact reversed itself. Logic suggests that such solidarity should become a constant factor if we want to prevent a disastrous development of events. ***

But here is the hitch: we must take a unified position together with the West. And that point is actually where the stereotypical thinking and behavior may in fact appear. In the first place is the legacy of the Soviet mentality with its built-in mechanism that ensures maintaining a constant level of hostility and suspicion toward everything Western, and especially American. "Why should we try to persuade Iran together with the Americans? It would be advantageous for them, and why should we let Washington lead us by the nose, especially since the main disputed issues have not been decided -- the CIS and others. To allow the Americans to score points is not in our interests." Secondly, strange as it may seem, these kinds of opinions can also be heard: "If the United States becomes reconciled with Iran, it will be bad for us, and the Americans will push us out of Iranian economic space. A nuclear Iran is better for us than a pro-American one." And in fact overall it appears that many of our politicians are convinced of one thing: a demonstration of solidarity with the West will do nothing for our leadership in terms of mobilizing the population on the basis of an upsurge of patriotism.

But what will happen if it turns out that the Iranian concessions are all pretense, and uranium, for example, is being secretly enriched in some third plant? The very same game of cat-and-mouse as in all the last few years... The Iranian diplomats are great masters at dragging out any talks and "burying them in words" and zig-zag maneuvering, from time to time "throwing a bone" to opponents and supposedly making concessions but always preserving uncertainty. But time will pass, and it is on their side. But anyone who is confident that time will always work for him may in fact even "get absorbed in the game" and may not only outsmart himself but even seriously harm others.

At the same time, regretfully one should say that it is specifically the question of the Iranian nuclear program that perhaps has most clearly revealed the weakness and incoherence of the world system for settling conflicts (if it exists at all) and the shortsightedness and egoism of the statesmen. Anyone familiar with history knows how ridiculous it is to put one's hopes on the wisdom, rationality, and logical behavior of politicians. And the 21st century is at this point merely confirming that.

Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta website, Moscow, in Russian 11 Nov 09